Darlene Beard v. KMart Corporation : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
Darlene Beard v. KMart Corporation : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
William R. Rawlings; attorney for appellee.
M. David Eckersley; Prince, Yeates, Geldzahler; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Beard v. K-Mart, No. 20000095 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2615






M. David Eckersley 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
Court of Appeals No. 20000095-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
>  APPELLEE 
William R. Rawlings 
Law Offices of William R. Rawlin 
11576 South State Street 
Suite 1102 F/LED 
Draper, UT 8 4 ^ ^ 
Attorney for Appellee JM 2 I 2000 
Cleric of th» court 






M. David Eckersley 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
Court of Appeals No. 20000095-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
William R. Rawlings 
Law Offices of William R. Rawlings 
11576 South State Street 
Suite 1102 
Draper, UT 84020 
Attorney for Appellee 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 1 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition In Court Below 2 
C. Statement of Facts Relevant to The Issue 3 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
VI. ARGUMENT 7 
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO ESTABLISH THAT PLAINTIFF 
SOUGHT AND OBTAINED SURGERY AS A DIRECT AND PROXIMATE 
RESULT OF THE PAIN SHE SUFFERED FROM DEFENDANT'S 
NEGLIGENCE 
VII. CONCLUSION 18 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 19 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
CASES 
Alta Health Strategies Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Serv.. 
930 P.2d 280 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 1 
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d 461, 467 (Utah 1996) 17 
Butterfield v. Cook. 817 P.2d 333, 337 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 17 
Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995) 17 
Dennev v. St. Mark's Hosp.. 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968) 2, 6, 8, 13, 16 
Fitz v. Synths (USA). 990 P.2d 391 (Utah 1999) 8 
Fredrickson v. Maw. 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951)
 t 8, 9, 10 
Huggins v. Hicken. 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523 (Utah 1957) 8 
Jordan v. Smoot. 380 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) 15 
Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.. 905 P.2d 297 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 1 
Mahmood v. Ross. 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999) 1 
Malmstrom v. Olsen. 16 Utah 2d 316, 400 P.2d 209 (1965) 8, 9, 10 
Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n 
v. Graystone Pines. Inc.. 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982) 2 
Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande W. Rd. Co.. 
4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P.2d 849 (1956) 13 
Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products. Inc.. 939 P.2d 1213 (Utah App. 1997) 17 
Polaco v. Smith. 376 So. 2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) 15 
ii 
Schutt v. Schumacher. 548 N.W.2d 381 (N.D. 1996) 14 
State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) 16 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 
820 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 16, 17 
Swan v. Lamb. 584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978) 8 
Townsend v. Stamper. 398 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1965) 15 
Walton v. Gallbraith. 166 N.W.2d 605 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) 14 
White v. Fox. 665 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1983) 1 
Wilson v. Qldroyd. 267 P.2d 759, 1 Utah 2d 362, (Utah 1954) 18 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2(4) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1996) 1 
iii 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1996). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was the Trial Court correct to deny Defendant's motion for a directed verdict because 
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Plaintiffs neck and hand surgeries 
resulted from Kmart's negligence? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A party who moves for a directed verdict "has the very difficult burden of showing 
that no evidence exists that raises a question of material fact." Alta Health Strategies Inc. 
v. CCI Mechanical Servs.. 930 P.2d 280, 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Where, as here, a party 
appeals the denial of a motion for directed verdict, the appellate court is required to examine 
"the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the party moved against, and will sustain the denial if reasonable minds 
could disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict." Mahmood v. Ross. 990 P.2d 
933, 937 (Utah 1999) (quoting White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1983)). Stated 
differently, if there is any evidence raising a question of material fact, a directed verdict is 
improper and the denial must be affirmed. Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co.. 905 P.2d 297, 
299 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Thus, this Court reviews "the trial court's decision to determine if the evidence at trial 
raised a question of material fact which precluded judgment as a matter of law." Mahmood, 
990 P.2d at 937. In this case, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict, must be affirmed unless Defendant can show that no reasonable mind could conclude 
that the evidence at trial raised a material fact. See id.: Management Committee of 
Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines. Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff/Appellee Darlene Beard (Plaintiff) brought this personal injury negligence 
action against Defendant/Appellant Kmart (Defendant). Plaintiff alleged and the jury found 
that on September 15, 1996, Plaintiff was injured at a Kmart store when Defendant's 
employee struck her in the head with his elbow as he attempted to start a lawnmower. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition In Court Below 
On or about May 16, 1997, Plaintiff filed an action against Defendant in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant answered and after discovery the 
case proceeded to a jury trial on October 12-14, 1999, before the Honorable Tyrone E. 
Medley, Third District Court Judge. 
At the close of Plaintiff s case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict as to one 
limited issue with respect to damages: whether there was sufficient evidence that Plaintiffs 
"neck surgery or carpal tunnel surgery was related to this incident at Kmart." (R. at 334; 
Trans. Vol. II p. 425-26.) After brief argument and following the Court's review of the case 
of Penney v. St. Mark's Hospital. 442 P.2d 944, 21 Utah 2d 189, (Utah 1968) which case 
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was provided by defense counsel, the Trial Court denied the motion concluding that "there's 
sufficient evidence, considering the evidence, in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff to 
submit the case to the jury." (Id, at 430.) 
Before submitting the case, both parties requested that the Trial Court give the jury 
the standard "personal injury-general damages" instruction. The Trial Court gave this 
requested instruction which provides in part: "[n]o definite standard or method of calculation 
is prescribed by law to fix reasonable compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is the 
opinion of any witness required as to the amount of such reasonable compensation." (R. at 
249) 
The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff, fixing total damages at $406,058, including 
$156,058 for past and future economic damages. Judgment was entered accordingly on 
November 22, 1999. 
Defendant filed its notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court on January 28, 2000. 
On March 24, 2000, pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2(4), this matter was transferred to 
this Court. 
C. Statement of Facts Relevant to The Issue 
Based on Defendant's Brief to this Court ("Brief of Appellant," hereinafter "Def. 
Br."), it is clear that the parties are in substantial agreement, at least with respect to what 
evidence is in the record. This is particularly true regarding most of the material facts related 
to the issue on appeal. 
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Thus, Defendant concedes that there is evidence that supports the fact that Plaintiff 
"was injured on September 15, 1999, at a Kmart store in Kearns, Utah when she was struck 
in the head by the elbow of a Kmart employee." (Def. Br. at 1.) Defendant concedes further 
that there is evidence that immediately after being struck Plaintiff suffered a terrible 
headache and pain in her knee and right side, that she became nauseated on the way home, 
that her hands hurt to drive, that she went to the doctor the next day complaining of head, 
neck, knee and foot pain and that thereafter she continued to have severe headaches, a sore 
neck, aching hands, leg and foot pain. (14 at 1-2.) Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff 
testified that her neck problems began at the time she was struck in the head at Kmart and 
of "her belief that her neck surgery was, therefore, the iesult of that incident." (Id at 9-10.) 
Significantly, Defendant also admits there was evidence which would tend to support 
the denial of its motion, namely, that "Plaintiffs own testimony that her neck and wrist 
problems had their onset with her injury at Kmart, that most of her treatment for neck 
problems began at the time of her injury at Kmart and that her treating physician indicated 
that there was a 'chronologic association' with the Kmart incident and her neck complaints." 
(Def. Br. at 2-3.) Although not expressly noted in Defendant's Brief, there was additional 
medical testimony and medical records also tending to show that Plaintiffs neck and hand 
or wrist injuries began with the Kmart incident and by reasonable inference were proximately 
caused when Plaintiff was struck in the head at that time. (See R. at 334; Trans. Vol. II at 
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213, 214,215, 217, 218, 222, 224 (Testimony of Dr. McCaa); 14 at 255; 256 (Testimony of 
Dr. Rawlings). 
In fact, Defendant expressly concedes that "Plaintiff unquestionably presented 
sufficient evidence to support a verdict finding she suffered damages as a result of Kmarf s 
negligence." (Def. Br. at 11 (emphasis added).) Specifically, "the jury was entitled to 
believe Ms. Beard that her neck and hands were injured in the Kmart incident." (Id. 
(emphasis added).) 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although Defendant concedes there was sufficient evidence that Plaintiffs neck and 
hands were injured as a result of Defendants negligence, (Def. Br. at 11), Defendant argues 
the Trial Court should have directed a verdict on the very narrow issue of whether certain 
treatment Plaintiff received—neck and wrist surgeries—were a result of Defendant's 
negligence. Defendant contends that only expert medical opinion testimony will suffice to 
permit the jury to consider this damages question. 
There are four separate reasons why the Trial Court was correct and why the 
Defendant was wrong on this issue. First, medical opinion evidence is required only in 
"medical injury cases." This is an ordinary premises-liability case, not a medical-injury case 
involving claims against medical personnel. 
Next, the rule requiring medical-opinion testimony applies only when the case 
depends on the "effect of medicine," the "results of surgery," or whether the defendant 
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received the ordinary skill of like medical personnel in the community. None of these 
situations are present here. 
Third, and perhaps most important, it is well established that there is no need for 
medical- opinion testimony when the facts may be determined by use of the senses by lay 
persons. In this case an ordinary lay person could reach a reasoned conclusion based on the 
evidence that Plaintiffs hands and neck were injured in the Kmart incident, that Plaintiff 
suffered pain as a result, that there was no significant history of problems related to the 
Plaintiffs neck or wrists and to relieve the pain, Plaintiff sought and received medical 
treatment including neck and wrist surgery. Thus, upon such evidence a jury is entitled to 
conclude that the surgeries were proximately caused by Kmarf s negligence. 
Finally, none of the Utah authority Defendant relies upon is directly on point. 
Moreover, the case of Penney v. St. Mark's Hospital (supra) relied upon by the Defendant 
both during trial and this appeal specifically supports the Plaintiffs position. In addition, 
many courts throughout the county have considered similar questions under like 
circumstances and hold medical-opinion testimony is not necessary. 
In any event, even if the denial of a directed verdict on this narrow question were 




EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO ESTABLISH THAT PLAINTIFF SOUGHT 
AND OBTAINED SURGERY AS A DIRECT AND PROXIMATE RESULT OF 
THE PAIN SHE SUFFERED FROM DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE. 
Defendant makes a very narrow argument on this appeal. Defendant does not claim 
that there was insufficient evidence on any of the essential elements of a negligence cause 
of action. It raises no issue that there was insufficient evidence on the questions of Kmart's 
duty to Plaintiff, its breach of that duty, or even that its negligent conduct was the proximate 
cause of injury to Plaintiffs hands and neck. Rather, Defendants only point on this appeal 
is that there is insufficient medical evidence with respect to particular items of damage. 
Thus, Defendant seeks a remand and new trial limited to damages. 
Specifically, Defendant's sole claim is that there is no competent evidence that certain 
medical treatments Plaintiff received—neck and wrist surgeries—were items of damage 
caused by Defendant's negligence. And on this point, Defendant's only argument is that 
Plaintiff failed to introduce expert medical-opinion testimony that these surgeries were 
caused by Defendant's negligence. Other evidence on the issue, Defendant implies, is 
insufficient as a matter of law. 
For four independent reasons, however, Defendant is flatly wrong that opinion 
testimony was required on this issue under the circumstances. 
First, medical-opinion testimony is certainly not required in every personal-injury 
case. The requirement for such testimony has historically been limited to "medical injury" 
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cases, that is, cases in which the alleged injury is caused by medical personnel or medical 
equipment suppliers. See, e.g.. Fitz v. Synths (USA). 990 P.2d 391,393 (Utah 1999) (in case 
against manufacturer of surgical bone screws Court said "medical expert testimony is 
required to prove proximate cause in a medical injury case") (emphasis added); Penney v. 
St. Mark's Hosp.. 21 Utah 2d 189, 192, 442 P.2d 944, 946 (1968) (case against hospital 
based on alleged negligence of its x-ray technician); Malmstrom v. Olsen, 16 Utah 2d 316, 
400 P.2d 209 (1965) (malpractice action against chiropractor); Huggins v. Hicken. 6 Utah 
2d 233, 238, 310 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah 1957) (malpractice action against surgeon). Clearly, 
the case at bar is not a medical injury case as that term historically has been used. 
Second, and more significant, the rationale underlying the medical-injury cases is 
totally inapplicable here. In Utah, the genesis of the medical-injury rule is Fredrickson v. 
Maw. 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951), overruled on other grounds. Swan v. Lamb. 584 
P.2d 814 (Utah 1978). In Fredrickson the court noted the rule may be applicable in three 
situations: 
The better-reasoned cases announce a rule of law to the 
effect that in those cases which depend upon knowledge of the 
scientific effect of medicine, the results of surgery, or whether 
the attending physician exercised the ordinary care, skill and 
knowledge required of doctors in the community which he 
serves, must ordinarily be established by the testimony of 
physicians and surgeons. 
Fredrickson. 119 Utah at 387, 227 P.2d at 773. 
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In the instant case, the issue which Defendant claims requires expert testimony is not 
one of those mentioned in Fredrickson: the issue here does not involve the scientific effect 
of medicine, results of surgery or whether any physician exercised the requisite degree of 
care. Instead, the issue here is whether Plaintiff sought and received medical treatment, 
specifically, neck and wrist surgery, as a direct result of pain that was caused by the Kmart 
incident. 
Third, even if the Fredrickson medical injury rule otherwise applied to the case at bar, 
this case clearly comes within the corollary rule or exception recognized in Fredrickson and 
applied there: 
There is, however, another well-recognized rule holding that 
when facts may be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses 
of lay witnesses, it is not necessary that expert testimony be 
produced and relied upon. 
Id.. 227 P.2d at 773. Thus, in Fredrickson the court held that jurors did not need expert 
testimony to find that a surgeon's failure to remove gauze from Plaintiffs mouth constituted 
a lack of due care. Id, 227 P.2d at 773. 
This corollary rule was cited and applied in another medical-injury case, Malmstrom 
v. Olsen. 16 Utah 2d 316,400 P.2d 209 (1965). There the Plaintiff alleged injuries as a result 
of a chiropractor's actions in violently jerking Plaintiffs head. The Supreme Court held that 
any lay person would know "without expert testimony that a chiropractor who so violently 
jerked his patient's head and neck, which had prior thereto been without pain . . . would not 
be using standards of care required by chiropractors in the vicinity." 400 P.2d at 212. 
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In the instant case, similar to both Fredrickson and Malmstrom. there was evidence 
from which an ordinary lay person could reach a reasonable conclusion from his or her own 
senses, without any need for expert opinion testimony. It is important to note however, there 
was in fact medical opinion testimony clearly suggesting that the neck and wrist surgeries 
were in fact related to the incident at Kmart. Not only did the treating surgeon discuss his 
reasons and cause for performing the surgeries, both Dr. McCaa and Dr. Rawlings discussed 
the lack of any significant complaints by the Plaintiff in her neck and wrist prior to the 
subject incident. 
Dr. Peterson testified: 
Q. Now, in your - in that letter that is on page 243,1 believe you were 
addressing the cause of Ms. Beard's surgery, if I'm not mistaken. Do 
you see anywhere in there where you talk about what may have been 
the cause of the problem? 
A. I believe in the next to the last paragraph, I do make some mention. 
Q. What did you say in that regard? 
A. Basically, I say it's - this letter is in response to a question, and the - the 
question is, you know, what the cause is. The answer is basically, I 
have no way of - I have no way of proving anything. But the 
association is that Mrs. Beard came to me and - and, more or less, was 
a person who was doing well prior to this incident at Kmart and since 
that time had been suffering a rather significant problems which could 
be - you know, which was associated with some significant anatomic 
compromise in her neck and from my standpoint, there was a 
chronologic association from the time of the incident to the time of the 
onset of symptoms. 
Q. What do you mean by chronological association? 
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A. Happened at the same time. And Ms. Beard, to my knowledge, did not 
- and this is based on Mrs. Beard talking to me. But, to my knowledge, 
she did not have these complaints prior to being hit at Kmart. (R. at 
334; Trans, at Vol. II p302;303.) 
Dr. McCaa testified: 
Q. Now, down there it says DX. Would that mean diagnosis? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what is the diagnosis, doctor? 
A. Post-concussive syndrome, neck pain, questionable myofascial-
myofascial syndrome, pain in the right ankle and knee and thoracic 
spine, all historically related to the above" meaning the incident. 
Q. At Kmart. And you prescribed -
A. At Kmart. 
Dr. McCaa continues: 
Q. Okay. Doctor, is there anything in her history that you're aware of 
which would suggest that she had a need for surgery before the accident 
of 9-15-96? 
A. No, sir. (R. at 334; Trans, at Vol. II, p224 and 226.) 
Dr. Rawlings also testified regarding his review of extensive past medical records 
going back as far as 1984: 
Q. Dr. Rawlings, what if anything, did you glean from those records? And 
be specific as to whether it's a - what the records you're referring to 
are. 
A. It's Dr. Gunn, the chiropractor, that she had seen over the years. And 
just looking at them, I highlighted a few things and then I went back 
and looked at it again. There's initial form - or one of the earlier date -
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forms that she had in that office that shows a number of treatment 
dates. And-
Q. What year are we talking about? 
A. 1984 through 1991. 
Q. What is it about that time period of time? 
A. Well, I just - in looking at these records, I notice that everything from 
July '84 through April of '91 is listed on this one sheet, all of the 
records. I mean - and she had I don't know how many treatments, but 
it looks - looks to be nearly 20 office visits listed on this one sheet. 
Excuse me. 
And then after the accident, his notes seem to change. And what I 
mean by that is, for example, this page right here has the same amount 
of lines used up, but it represents one week. 
Q. And what does that mean to you? 
A. Well, just that there was a lot more going on and a lot - lot more to log 
and - and - and just write about. And then another page represents just 
a 12-day period. Another one is just another - another week. So, in 
other words, in three or four sheets, it covers maybe three or four 
weeks; whereas the one sheet covered seven years prior to - prior to the 
accident. And I don't -1 hope that's not confusing, but it just kind of 
stuck out to me. 
Q. What you're saying, the treatment after the accident was a lot more 
aggressive? 
A. It seemed like there was a lot more to do and it just shows to me that 
she was a pretty easy, periodic tune-up-type patient prior to this 
situation. 
Dr. Rawlings further testifies: 
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Q. Is there anything in the records you reviewed from Dr. McCaa or Dr. 
Gunn that would suggest the need that she should be referred to a 
neurologist for any reason? Before the accident. 
A. Right. Before the accident. No. (R. at 334; Trans, at Vol. II, p254; 
255; and 256.) 
The evidence showed that Plaintiff was injured in the Kmart incident, suffered severe 
pain as a result, and received medical treatment including neck and wrist surgeries. The 
ordinary layman can conclude upon such evidence and without additional expert testimony, 
that the surgery was the proximate result of the injury. 
Fourth, Defendant cites no Utah authority for its contention that expert medical 
testimony is necessarily required to justify submission of a particular item of damages, 
specifically medical expenses, to the jury. The only cases Defendant relies on deal with the 
different issue of whether, in the absence of expert medical testimony there is any competent 
evidence that Plaintiffs injuries were caused by Defendant. (See Def. Br. at 7-9 (citing 
Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande W. Rd. Co.. 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P.2d 849 (1956), and 
Penney v. St. Mark's Hosp.. 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944)). In the instant case Defendants 
have conceded that issue stating that "Plaintiff unquestionably presented sufficient evidence 
to support a verdict finding she suffered damages as a result of Kmart's negligence" and 
more specifically that the "jury was entitled to believe Ms. Beard that her neck and hand 
were injured in the Kmart incident." (Def. Br. at 11.) 
Although Defendant cites no Utah cases directly on point and Plaintiff has located 
none, cases from jurisdictions throughout the nation hold, under similar circumstances, that 
13 
expert medical testimony is not required to submit to the jury questions about the need for 
particular medical treatments and related expenses. For example, in Walton v. Gallbraith. 
166 N.W.2d 605 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969), the plaintiff was injured in a taxi accident. She sued 
the cab driver alleging his negligence caused her neck and shoulder injuries. At trial no 
physician testified. The defense objected to the plaintiffs introduction of her medical bills 
on the ground that the evidence showed she had some medical problems pre-dating the 
accident and that there was no expert testimony to connect the bills causally to the accident. 
In words that are equally applicable here the Michigan court held: 
Defendant claims error in the introduction of the bills and 
plaintiff alleges that a causal connection between the accident 
and injury may be shown without expert testimony and, further, 
that causation is a matter to be submitted to the jury. 
A brief review of the function of a jury leads us to the 
conclusion that plaintiffs position is the correct one. Her 
testimony emphasizes the facts that there were no previous neck 
or back pains and that they began on the day after the accident. 
In a situation such as this, it should be clear to men of 
common experience that the cause of the injuries was the 
accident and no expert was needed to demonstrate this fact. 
Once causation was established, the evaluation of the necessity 
and reasonableness of the bills was within the province of the 
jury. 
Id at 606. 
Many other cases are to similar effect. See, e.g.. Schutt v. Schumacher. 548 N. W.2d 
381, 383 (N.D. 1996) ("Evidence of medical expenses can be admitted without expert 
medical opinion that the expenses were necessitated by the defendant's conduct, and, once 
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admitted upon a foundation showing the evidence is relevant, the question whether the 
medical expenses were incurred as a result of defendant's wrongdoing is for the jury to 
decide."); Jordan v. Smoot. 380 S.E.2d 714, 715 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (expert medical 
testimony not required to establish causal relationship between accident and injuries for 
which plaintiff sought treatment when no significant time elapsed between accident and onset 
of physical condition requiring treatment; a failure to introduce expert testimony under these 
circumstances is not grounds for directed verdict); Townsend v. Stamper. 398 S.W.2d 45,48 
(Ky. 1965) (plaintiffs testimony that she incurred all her medical expenses to treat the 
injuries sustained in accident made out a prima facie case and provided a reasonable basis 
for jury to conclude that the expenses were incurred as a result of the accident, even without 
expert medical testimony; defendants sought to show that plaintiffs ailments arose from 
conditions other than accident); Polaco v. Smith. 376 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1979) (when the only evidence that Plaintiffs medical treatment was a result of the accident 
was Plaintiffs testimony to that effect, "her testimony alone was sufficient predicate for 
allowing the jury to resolve the question of whether the medical bills were reasonable or 
necessary"). 
In sum, when, as here, even the Defendant concedes there is evidence that as a result 
of Defendant's negligence Plaintiff suffered injury to her neck and hands, (Def. Br. at 11), 
that she immediately began experiencing substantial pain in those areas and that she promptly 
sought and received treatment for that pain through surgery, there is sufficient evidence to 
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allow the jury to consider the surgeries and related expenses in determining damages, without 
expert medical testimony. 
It is interesting to note, the case of Penney v. St. Mark's Hospital (supra) so strongly 
relied upon by the Defendant during trial and this appeal, actually supports the Plaintiffs 
position. In that case, there was very little evidence of causation. The Court stated: 
The only evidence of causation in this case is the statement of 
Plaintiff that the x-ray technician 'pushed by neck and knees 
together much, much too far because he hurt the back of my 
head in some way.' (Emphasis added) 
The Court goes on to say: 
There is, however, another well-recognized rule holding that 
when facts may be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses 
of lay witnesses, it is not necessary that expert testimony be 
produced and relied upon. 
The Trial Court, therefore, was correct to deny Defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict on this ground. 
However, even assuming arguendo the Trial Court erred by denying the motion, the 
error was, at most, harmless. On appeal the appellant has the burden of demonstrating an 
error was prejudicial. State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989). To carry the burden the 
appellant must show more than a mere possibility that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings; the appellant must demonstrate a "reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome." 14 at 120; Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482,489 (Utah 
16 
Ct. App. 1991). Only errors the appellant demonstrates are prejudicial will support a 
reversal. LcL 
Here Defendant has clearly failed to demonstrate reversible error. The only error 
claimed merely goes to permissible items of damages. Even without considering the 
expenses associated with Plaintiffs neck and wrist surgeries, the jury easily could have 
awarded the same amount of damages and more. "Juries are generally allowed wide 
discretion in the assessment of damages." Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379, 1386 (Utah 
1995). 
The jury could have ignored Plaintiffs neck and hand surgeries entirely and awarded 
past economic damages based on the four other surgeries which Plaintiff had and which 
Defendant does not challenge. This Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
jury's findings and upholds its calculation of damages "so long as there is competent 
evidence to sanction it." I i The expenses associated with the other four surgeries clearly 
constitute the requisite evidence. 
Finally, in the case of Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products. Inc., 939 P.2d 1213, (Utah App. 
1997) the Court in quoting Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 337 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) and 
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d 461,467 (Utah 1996) (Citation omitted) stated: 
In reviewing a jury verdict, we do not "reweigh the evidence or 
investigate witness credibility." Instead, "we view the evidence 
in the light most supportive of the verdict, and assume that the 
jury believed those aspects of the evidence which sustain its 
findings and judgement." 
17 
In Wilson v.Oldrovd. 267 P.2d 759, 1 Utah 2d 362, (Utah 1954) the Court stated the 
limitations in setting aside a jury verdict when they said: 
The concept of trial by jury necessarily presupposes that there is 
a wide area within which the pendulum of the jury's 
deliberations may swing without interference from the Court. 
And so long as they remain within the boundaries of what 
reasonable minds could believe, their findings should remain 
inviolate. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Trial Court be 
affirmed in all respects. 
Dated this 21st day of June, 2000. 
LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS 
By / / ( / / / ^ / / / / ^ 
William R. Rawlm^s/ 
Attorney for Pla^tiff/Appellee 
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